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Testing Old, Testing New:
Schoolboy Psychology and
the Allocation of Intellectual
Resources

Gene V Glass
University of Colorado, Boulder

There will be no divining of the future here- no megatrends, no reference to
Orwell (except this one) . What little we truly know about the future does not bear
mentioning. Nor shall I refer to micro-computers, data banks, and other gaudy
paraphernalia that the future holds for us. The future is best seen in a rear-view
mirror. We can at least hope to see more clearly the recent past we have traversed. Appearances of rapid change are usually superficial. If we see the past
and present clearly, we will know as much of our future as it is ever permitted us
to know .
Kenneth Boulding (1968) contends that the discovery of knowledge is absolutely unpredictable, since knowledge is the one thing that if we cou ld predict
when we would discover it we would have it already. The evolution of a technology , if it were not really radically new, might be predicted with some success;
but then, if we can't predict the discovery of new knowledge and we can on ly
predict changes in ordinary technology , then surely we have little idea of the
important changes that lie ahead. New knowledge is revolutionary ; technology is
Establishment. The discovery of knowledge upsets things , changes the way lives
are led. Techno logy serves old entrenched interests and established institutions.
The glacial evolution of testing in this century reveals the source of its momentum- new technologies are moving it , not new knowledge. Testing is the
conservative wing of the Social Science party .

A Point of View: Abstracted Empiricism
The most revealing perspective to ass ume for viewing the evolution and the
current condition of testing is that which affords the clearest picture of how
testing relates to the basic disciplines in the study of human behavior. In the last
9
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100 years, testing has moved graduall y from the center to the periphery of the
behavioral and social sciences. Once an integral part of the best thinking on
human development and behavior , testing' has progressively grown more inbred
and dissociated from the leading theoretical positions in psychology and the
soc ial sciences. In its position at the margin , testing has come to serve more
faithfully the goals of its own professional subculture and of a particular political
subculture (i.e., its own inte llectual Establishment and the professional-managerial Establishment) than to serve the ends of science and the true aims of education . To fulfill its promise , testing must find its way back to the center of
psychological thinking.
My message here does little more than echo a theme sounded by Anne
Anastasi (1967) in her 1966 presidential address to Division 5 of the American
Psychological Association .
. . . psychological testing is becoming dissociated from the mainstrea m of co ntemporary psychology. Those psychologists spec ializing in psychometrics have been
devoting more and more of the ir efforts to refining the tec hniques of test co nstruction , while losing sight of the behav ior they set out to measure. Psychological testin g
today places too much emphas is on testing and too little on psychology. As a result,
outd ated interpretations of tes t performance may remain insulated from the impact of
subsequent behavior research. It is my co nte ntion that the isolat ion of psychometrics
from other relevant areas of psychology is one of the conditions that have led to the
prevalent public hostility toward testing (p. 297) . Although the very essence of
psychological testing is the measurement of behavior, testing today is not adeq uate ly
ass imil ating relevant deve lopments from the science of behav ior . . ..
It is noteworthy that the term " test theory" ge nerally refers to the mechani cs of
test construction , such as the nature of the score scale and the procedures for
assessing reliability and validity. The term does not customarily refer to psychological theory about the behavior under consideration. Psychometricians appear to
shed much of the ir psycho log ical knowledge as they concentrate upon the minutiae
of elegant statistical techniques . Moreover, when other types of psychologists use
standardi zed tests in their work, they too show a tendency to slip down several
notches in psychological sophisti cation (p. 300).

Anastasi saw several reasons for this unfortunate dissociation of psychological measurement from psychological theory. Increasing specialization in all disciplines has lessened the chances that one individual will be conversant with both
the technical rigmarole that has come to characterize modern psychometrics and
the theories of psychology themselves. The expense involved in developing
major tests militates against changing them; thus the tests of today reflect the
psychology of yesterday. Psychometricians have capitulated to unrealistic public
demands for short cuts and magic- psychological theory is often ravaged in the
process.
Four years ago, also on the occasion of an American Psychological Associa-
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tion Divi sion 5 presidential address, Robert Glaser (1981) voiced the same
concern expressed by Anastasi 15 years earlier: Testing is estranged from its
roots in psychological theory . In the written version of hi s address entitled "The
Future of Testing: A Research Agenda for Cognitive Psychology and Psychometrics," Glaser attempted to present " ... areas of soc ial concern in which
education and testing might profit from coordination with potentially helpful
areas of psychological research" (p . 935). Glaser applied his understanding of
recent advances in cognitive psychology to a critique of ex isting school testing
practices and pointed toward useful applications of recent developments in the
psychology of learning and thinking . The work of Brown and Burton (1978) and
of Siegler (1976) was suggested as a bas is for ways of diagnosing failures in
learning and intellectual performance. Herbert Simon 's (Simon & Chase, 1973)
imag inative research on the nature of expertise was advanced as a beginning in
the assessment of differences in knowledge structures and cognitive processes
between novices and experts. The work of Hunt , Sternberg, and others suggested
to Glaser new views on the assess ment of aptitudes with the ultimate goal of
altering and building those abilities that early-day psychologists were prone to
accept as being immutable.
My proposed point of criticism would seem ad hoc and unconvincing if it
were said to apply somehow uniquely to the problems of measurement and
testing. Fortunately, such is not so. C. Wright Mills (1959) argued forcefully that
the schism between method and theory is everywhere evident in the social
sciences. Aimless fact finding unguided by worthy conceptual analysis was
christened "abstracted empiricism" by Mill s. Once severed from worthwhile
theoretical thinking, abstracted empiricism follows a bureaucratic course of
development.
I doubt that I can advance any more helpful message than to commend once
more to your attention the wisdom in the observations of my respected colleagues
Anastasi and Glaser. It will give me the greatest satisfaction , in addition , if I can
convince you to entertain an even broader scope of relevant psychological theory
than they imagined as be ing a proper mooring place for psychological and
educational meas urement. But before mak ing that attempt , permit me first to
recount briefly how testing came to ass ume its current condition, which more
people agree with each passing year is in need of repair.

Psychology and Psychometrics in 1980: The Golden
Days
Testing as we have known it for the past 75 years was originally the tool of
psychologists and social sc ientists living through the denouement of the great
Western European empires. The soc ial sc ientists of the first two decades of thi s
century were, with varying degrees of consc iou sness, Social Darwinists . The
cultural relativist anthropologists, such as Boaz and later Mead , are the excep-
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tions that prove the rule. Regardless of one's contemporary political leanings, it
is difficult today to read Galton or Terman without blanching at the coarse
ugliness of it, e.g., Galton (1892) analyzing the genetic superiority of one (19thcentury English) village over its neighbor. But enough has been written about
this embarrass ing era in the history of psychometrics (Block & Dworkin, 1976;
Fallows, 1980; Gou ld , 1981) , and I do not bring it up here again to heap insult on
contumely . I I want instead to praise testing of that time; for in spite of its
grossness then, it had something that it lost soon after and is missing today. At
least the concern with measurement of human behavior in the early stages of its
hi story was allied with the best thinking of the time on psychology and sociology, i. e, with evo lution by natural selection , with the attempt to ap ply ideas
of biological evolution to culture and society. This was more true, of course, of
the European psychometrici ans than the Americans; as Sizer (1970, p. 15) observed: " . . . Americans engineered the idea of mental testing and adapted late
nineteenth-century European theories to the realities of a more modern America .
Terman, Thorndike, and the rest were pioneers, but more as engineers than as
theoreticians." It would indeed be an act of insensitive second-guessing to think
that Galton and Spearman and Goddard and Terman and the others were wrong
and should have known better. They may well have been wrong, just as our best
theories will seem puerile to future sc ientists, but they were the lead ing psychologists and social scientists of their day and testing was their most useful tool. It
was, I submit, testing's golden era, and it has not known their like since .
Perhaps, as with the triumphs of a precocious child , testing's early successes led
to its current difficulties. The techno logy of testing was quickly wedded to the
burgeoning field of statistical methods. The discipline began to grow specialized
and esoteric. In the 1920s, testing entered a stage of hyper-rationali zation from
which it has never re-emerged . Multiple factor analysis plumbed the " vectors of
the mind" (Thurstone, 1935) with machinery (centroids, tetrads, reference systems, etc.) beyond the ken of psychologist and soc ial scientist. It is of more than
passing significance that the increase in technical sophistication of the testing
movement had little effect on tests themselves or the theories on which they were
based. I cannot, for example, discern Thurstone or Hol zinger's lineaments in any
of the contemporary tests of intelligence. Indeed, the modern intelli gence scale
would seem a familiar artifact if placed in the hands of a suddenly reincarnated
psychologist of the Edwardian period. I know of no sc ience- save perhaps,
anthropology or history-about which the same could be said .
The development of psychometrics from its early triumphs to the modern era
parallels, peculiarly enough , the birth and growth of a bureaucratic agency I For the most recent chapte r in this hi storica l controversy , see Snyderm an and Herrnstein (19B3) ,
who arg ue that , in spite of the raci st character of much of the psyc hometrics of the earl y part of this
century, it is doubtful that the research directly influenced the passage of the Immi gration Act of
1924. Their apologia reminds one of the man who, when acc used of murderin g three men and a dog,
forthwith produced (before the court) in hi s defe nse the dog ali ve.
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there are, indeed, lest anyone doubt it , bureaucracies and bureaucrats of ideas. It
is a natural and human failing when one has access to and control over specialized information to exert that control against change (Selznick, 1953). Technological society's emphas is on expertise and spec ial ization produce trained
incompetence, the narrowing of the scope permitted for intellectual experimentation. Psychometricians, with control over arcane corners of mathematics, exemplify forces such as these (Andresky, 1972). As Robert Merton (1975) observed, the speciali st begins to resist change because of vested interest in ... the
current structure, of a soc iety or cu lture, whether material or intellectual. "Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means , becomes transformed into
an end- in-itse lf; there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals,
whereby an instrumental value becomes a term inal value . . . " (p . 28).
This displacement of goals took place in testing between about 1940 and 1960
as nearly as I can judge . Spurred by what we are told were the great victories for
testing in World War II (Chase, 1948), all of which were atheoretical and
pragmatic, the discipline of psychometrics began to take shape apart from psychology . It turned its back on psychology and reached instead for an independent, autonomous set of "principles of measurement" that transcended everything in particular. I remember my delight in discovering in 1960 that I could
read with nearly complete comprehension the great treatise on psychometrics ,
Gulliksen's Theory of Mental Tests [1950], simply because I had overlearned
college math and knew less than nothing at all about psychology.
The development of reliability and validity theory- two of the greatest
achievements of the psychometric movement- can be viewed as an over-ambitious attempt to axiomatize a discipline. I view Cronbach's work over the past
two decades (and in particular his coll aboration with Meehl [Cronbach & Meehl,
1955]) as an attempt to correct the errant ways of methodologists who fe lt they
could safely leave substance behind in the search for the abstract foundations of
measurement. It took a while to drive home the point that the validity of testing is
a quality of a complex use of information; it is not a property of a random
variable. It has taken longer to make the point that reliability is no different, and
just as a test has no validity, so it has no realiability either. Measurements have
meanings, and they permit or obstruct thinking to various degrees. The process
by which measurements are taken , as well as the ideas that gave rise to the
measurements, are only judged in accord with how both - ideas and measurements- lead toward greater understanding. The relationship is reciprocal: constructs and observations , meanings and methods . The message is Cronbach and
Meehl's .
By the early 1960s , it is fa ir to say that testing in psychology and education
was severed from its roots in the study of human behavior. Indeed , testing
flourishes today where the env ironment is starkly atheoretical (education) and
withers in precisely those loca les where thinking about human behavior is freshest and most exciting (psychology , psychiatry).
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The Modern Testing Estab lishment
What then has become of testing and measurement? Estranged from the behavioral and social sciences, grown mathematically elaborate and worshipful of the
"general principles of measurement," what has become of testing since it
reached maturity and autonomy in the academies of post-World War II America
and Europe? In short, it sold out to the highest bidder; it went Establishment. In
the world of work and in education, testing stepped forward to play the role of
gatekeeper and management tool in the processing of human lives for the meritocracy: professional lightning rod attracting and grounding the anger of the
excluded and discarded; factotum for society's dirty work.
The testing industry and, more regrettably, the discipline of measurement in
the Academy no longer serve science in its search for understanding nor education in its search to educe from individuals that which is best in them. Increasingly they serve a national and international system of processing people by
number, managing the flow of bodies from institution to institution, documenting the expected progress of pupils through the vast educational ' 'system." For
its efforts, the psychometric industry with its academ ic support system acquires
huge caches of unexpended income .
The lack of articu lation between measurement and substantive theory is particularly serious in education, that most pragmatic and atheoretical of all disci plines where testing is applied. Achievement test batteries are designed around
what is thought to be the content of the school curriculum as determined by
surveys of textbooks, teachers and other tests. Textbooks and curricula are
designed , on the other hand, in part around the content of tests. One cannot
discern which side leads and which follows; each side influences the other, yet
nothing assures us that both are tied to an intelligent conceptualization of what an
educated person ought to be .
Considering the prominence of testing in contemporary American schools, it
is amazing to realize how useless testing seems to those closest to the core of
schooling: teachers and pupils. It is scarcely any secret that teachers regard
standardized abi lity and achievement tests as an irrelevance or worse. They
complain that they learn nothing from the results that wasn't obvious before the
test was given; the scores give no clue as to what should be done to eradicate
ignorance or take advantage of talent and ski ll. Testing is a transaction between
the testing compan ies and school administrators, state education officials , government agencies, lawyers and other middlemen in the system of schooling.
Tests are not used by educators to decide how children shou ld be educated
because they are not designed for such purposes and are virtually worthless
toward such ends (Hawkins, 1977). This fact greatly concerned Oscar Buros
(1977) who decried the drifting away of achievement tests from what was taught
in a course toward the goal of predicting individual differences in attainment at
higher grades. After two decades of research on aptitude-treatment interactions,
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it remains unclear whether one ought to teach so as to utilize the person 's
strongest aptitude, or teach so as to compensate for the weakest aptitude, or both
or neither; and perhaps the meager harvest of so much research should be bl amed
on the primitive concepts of aptitude on which the tests are based . Gl aser ( 198 1)
has complained for decades that tests are useless for dec iding what it is that a
child can and cannot do , hence the need to reference the scale that a test creates
to the criterion of skill s, knowledges, and understandings that comprise whatever
it is that we think of as facility in reading, math , science and the like. The
di stortion of this eminently sensibl e call for "criterion referenced testing" (now
repeated in hopes of productive hybridization of education and cogniti ve psychology [Glaser, 1981]) into item banks for behavioral objectives with cut-off
scores for mastery is one of the more unfortunate inventions of modern psychometrics. My colleague David Hawkins at the University of Colorado reached
back to Dewey in making a simil ar argument in his brilliant little book , The
Science and Ethics of Equality (1 977 , p. 75):
.. . we need a framework of ge neral ideas adequ ate to the de ve lopmental perspecti ve in whi ch a ll important abilities and talents should be viewed. This means that
we should dig under the surface of those tests which have provided the empirical
basis for so much of stati stical psychometrics, and specificall y the vario us inte lli gence tests ... . I do not want to beat the IQ tests over the head. T hey are useful
in the ir way , though as John Dewey said more than once, they are of little use to
good teachers, who need both a refin ement and an immedi ac y of di sc riminati on in
the ir daily work with children which global test averages do not provide.

Gullickson [1 98 3] surveyed 30 educati on professors and 400 teachers to record their priorities for the content of educational measurement courses. Of 50
topics rated for des ired emphas is in a college course, the greatest di screpancies
between pro fessors and teachers emerged on these topics: Teachers wished for
"great emphasis" to be pl aced on ways of " interviewing pupils and parents,"
" observing pupil s' work habits," evaluating' ' cl ass discuss ions" and " interpersonal relationships"; the professors rated these topics as deserving only "slight
emphasis." (In fact, these items were among the top ten rated items by the
teachers and among the professors' bottom ten! T he professo rs' highest rated
topics were calculating the mean and variance and calcul ating correlation
coeffi cients. )
The contemporary problem of " learning disabilities" is a case that can be
advanced in behalf of the argument that testing in education follow s the wro ng
lights and serves the wrong masters. Measurement of LD is virtually uniformly
pursued across the United States today. IQ and achievement test scores are
compared and "significant discrepancies" are tagged as evidence of LD (S hepard , Smith , & Voj ir, 1983; Smith , 1982). The use of available published tests to
do this work is encouraged by many factors: they are legally defensible, they
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seem scientific and unimpeachable to parents, they are cheap and qui ck. But they
are being used to measure what was called " under-achievement " three decades
ago. Learning disapility or lack of motivation? Can anyone tell the difference?
Well, of course, but not in the naive and mechanical way that these notions are
being translated into numbers by clinicians and psychometricians. It doesn' t
matter in the least whether one regards LD as "euphemi zing" or not; the periodic purging of dysphemisms like " retardate" or "slow learner" would only
seem unnecessary to one who had never been called such things. The whole idea
of " learning di sabilities" is th at obstacles to learning are more variegated and
worthy of detailed analysis than being ascribed to dullness or low intelligence. It
is manifest that learning involves the hardware of the brain and of the communication channels; and when learn ing goes wrong, these as well as what a child
has experienced in both his distant and recent hi story are impli cated . From thi s
point, the work of psychiatry , medi cine, cognitive psychology and the like mu st
beg in , and what we know of the technology of measurement may have a contribution to make . But the absurdly premature translation of ill-formed concepts of
LD into IQ versus achievement di screpanc ies was a managerial expedient of a
particularly mindless sort , motivated by legal, political and profess ional interests. Unfortunately , it was all too typical of how these interests have used
educational measurement .
Testing has found a new market in minimal competence testing in education
and in licensure and certification in the workplace . I regard both of these with
disappointment or di sdain (Getz & Glass , 1979; G lass, 1978; Glass, 1979;
Hogan, 1983; Olson, 1983). I need not go into details of these unseemly businesses. Perhaps it is enough to go on record again as be lieving that both application s of testing serve crass political ends: One, the ex tension of centralized
political control of education ; the other, the protection of economic self-interest
in the workpl ace . Neither (and thi s goes for academic selection as well) is based
on proof of utility that would justify its negative consequences in denial of
opportunities or restri ction of free trade.
Recently after reviewing and integrating the findings of over 500 psychotherapy outcome experiments, my co lleagues and I (Smith, Glass, & Miller,
1980, p. 187) remarked thus on the state of the research art in this area:
Psychotherapy-outcome research lacks nothing by way of differenti ated interventi ons. The literature on treat me nt is a veritabl e pharmacopoeia of prescriptio ns. T he
design of contro lled experimentati o n has been refined to a sc ie nce that is within the
grasp of any researcher who o wn s a tab le of rando m digits and recogni zes the
difference betwee n blind and sighted assess ment. Ho wever, the measurement of
o utcomes seems to have been abando ned at a primitive stage in its development.
Rating scales are throw n together w ith little co ncern expressed for the ir psychometric properties. Venerable paper-and -pencil tests ... with roots planted vaguely
in no particular theory of pathology or treatment are used to hunt for effects of
short-term and hi ghl y speciali zed brands of psychotherapy. A superfluity of instru-
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ments ex ists, and too little is known abo ut them to prefer one to another . Little is
known about their structure , and less is known abou t their sens itivity to treatment.

Thinking back to both of the Co leman et al. (1966; 1982) studies (of equality
of educational opportunity and of public and private school s), the FollowThrough evaluation (House , G lass, McLean, & Walker, 1978) and more, I
worry that modern testing and measurement- with their overwean ing attention
to the pragmatic, the conventional, the traditional - have too often not merely
failed to reveal the complexity and subtlety of human experience, but have
actually denigrated the value of attempts to improve it. The telescoping of the
immense variety in the Fo llow-Through models down into a standardized basic
ski lls test and two dubious "affective" measures was a travesty for which the
psychometric communit y might hold certain bureaucrats responsible (House et
aI. , 1978) , but the bureaucrats in question are quick to respond to such charges
that they chose the measures from among the best that the psychometric arts had
to offer.

BR IN GIN G MEASUREMENT BACK TO PSYCHOLOGY:
TOWARD A SOLUTION
Case Study Research
The growing significance of the naturalistic or "case-study" methodology in the
social sc iences poses important new problems for measurements; and if these
problems are accorded the attention they deserve, the benefits may accrue not
just to naturalistic methods but to measurement itself throughout the social sc iences. The translation of experience into an observational record- everywhere
the fundamental problem in measurement- always requires the imposition of
some explanatory , theoretical structure. We tend to forget or ignore this fact in
the established areas of testing and measurement, and then we accept the theoretical structure (bequeathed to our generation by faculty psychology or "selfconcept" psychology) not as suppos ition but as reality . This bit of self-deception
is more difficult to maintain in naturalistic research where experience is more
complex and different theoretical systems sti ll compete for favor. The naturali st ic scene focuses our attention on several of the problems that need to be
addressed by measurement theorists across the entire range of behavioral and
social sc iences: the necessary tie between theoretical structure and observation;
the problems of not oversimplifying , of doing justice to the complexity of human
systems (whether they be at the leve l of the individu al, the group or a whole
society); the difficulty of "slicing up the raw behavioral flux" and translating it
into observations or numbers (Meeh l, 1978); the unique problems attendant upon
the use of human observers of human behavior (i. e., the problems of Verstehen
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(Dilthey, 1959- 68) or countertransference as behavioral science method as Devereux (1967) has written of it). These, I submit, are the key methodological
problems that measurement must face if it is to further- rather than retard or
play only a superfluous role in-the progress of the social sciences.

Theoretical Possibilities
While I take some comfort in knowing that my observations about what is wrong
with testing today were seen earlier by my esteemed colleagues Anastasi and
Glaser among other references, I shall derive more satisfaction if I can broaden
ever so slightly the range of psychological theory to which testing and measurement would do well to attend . My colleagues have emphasized cognition and its
role in learning. It is true that Anastasi mentioned the importance of attending to
developments in personality theory, but she singled none out, advising her listener rather to keep abreast of relevant research in clinical and social psychology.
I wish to go further and counsel my fellow educationists and psychometricians
that the most exciting and productive thinking outside the area of cognitive
psychology is virtually untouched by psychometrics and that we could do less
well than to turn our attention there when we seek the path back to the best
scientific thinking on human behavior. The "affective domain," as it is so
inappropriately named, was not addressed by Anastasi or Glaser, and I take it as
a favor that they have left it to me to extend their thesis into this challenging
domain of human motives, desires, fears, wishes, antipathies, hopes, and
frustrations.
Anastasi (1967) bowed in the direction of "personality" assessment in her
1967 address, but it seemed a hesitant gesture . Although she urged psychometricians to keep abreast of clinical psychology, her vagueness on the matter of what
in particular in that vast area was worth attending to reflects another dissociation
of theory and practice in American psychology, namely, the schism between
psychology and psychiatry, or even the parallel split between academic and
clinical psychology (splits that have their own political and intellectual roots) .
Ever since psychiatry emerged from Bed lam and the scientific dark ages, the
dominant theoretical perspective has been psychoanalytic, Freudian. Strangely,
in spite of the antipathy with which psychodynamic theory is viewed by American academic psychologists, across the hall their colleagues in clinical psychology honor it as the pre-eminent theoretical system (Garfield & Kurtz, 1974,
1977). The extension of Freud's work made by such investigators as Hartmann,
Spitz, Jacobson, Mahler and now the younger generation of ego-psychologists
has produced a most impressive and far-reaching psychological theory of human
development and behavior (both "normal" and pathological) . Permit me to
declare myself. Coupled with neurophysiology and behavioral genetics, the psychoanalytic perspective represents our best hope for a comprehensive and useful
account of the development and psychology of human beings. And yet, the link
between psychoanalysis and psychometrics is virtuall y nonexistent.
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Not only is any connection between psychoanalytic psychology and psychometrics imposs ible to di scern , but the latter sometimes rather grandly imagines
that it has di sproved the former. A methodolog ical critique or a factor analysis of
Rorschac h responses , or a horse race between stati sti ca l and clinical predictions
will not deal with the chall enge that neo-analytic ego psychology presents to
empirical methodo logy. It is a curi ous fact unknow n to nearly all who cite Meehl
(1954) as the refutation of " clini ca l insight " (and then by implication "psychoanalytic theory ") that Paul Meehl 's theoretical leanings are se lf-proclaimed as
psychoanalytic. 2 This is not the place to defend psychoanalysis agai nst the
charge that it is " unsc ientific " -a charge made about equally often as the
charge that it is false, the two charges be ing contradictory, at least by Popper's
criterion of what constitutes a sc ientifi c proposition. The defense of the scientific
status of psychoanalysis was presented some time ago in Hook (1959) . I only
wi sh to add here that it is scientific in precisely the most signifi cant way and in
the way in which too many psycholog ical theories are inadequate, viz., the
conclusions of psychoanalysis (e.g., the meaning of dreams, parapraxes , the
operation of defense mechani sms, and the like) are " risky " propositions (in the
Popperian sense), meaning that they are not independentl y derivable from common sense.

Psychoanalytic Psychology
It is my opinion that psychoanalyti c psychology, parti cularly in its modern
forms, represents the most significant challenge and opportunity that testing and
measurement in the soc ial and behav ioral sc iences could ass ume. It promi ses to
change fundamentally the way in whi ch psychometrics is pursued outside the
narrow area of assessing aptitUde and learning. If studied seriously , psychoanalytic psychology could lead to new techniques of observation and at least new
concepts of the relation ship between manifest behavior and the enduring psychology of the individual.
I see thi s possible relationship only vaguely myse lf. Perhaps an exampl e or
two will he lp bring these generalities into better focus.
The measurement of "self-concept " is one o f the most active areas of psychometric concern , and yet the construct as embodied in modern tests is a hoary
and naive thing scarce ly developed any further th an William James's ( 1890)
thinking nearly a century ago. In Wiley's (1961) famous treatments of selfconcept measurement , though she treats the theoretical foundations of the construct with respect, they are revealed to be littl e more than vague, commonsensical sketches of the co nditioning of Philistine self-sati sfaction by a pair of bland
2" 1 am confide nt that psychoanal yti c co ncepts will be around after rubber band theory, tran sacti onal theory, attachment theory, labe ling theory, di ssonance theory, attributi on theo ry, and so on ,
have subsided into a state of innocuous desuetude .... At the very least, psyc hoa nalys is is an
interesting theory, which is more than I can say about so me of the ' theories' that are currentl y
fa shi onab le" (Meehl, 1978 , p. 8 17).
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parents molding little lumps of clay with praise and kisses. One current " theory," which is attracting psychometric attention (Marsh, Smith, & Barnes, 1983),
is a seven-part model of the self-concept: The self-concept is hypothes ized to
comprise (a) the physical ability self, (b) the appearance self, (c) the peer relations self, (d) the parent relations self, (e) the reading self, (0 the mathematics
self, and (g) the school subjects self. In a IO,OOO-word research report on this
theory , one reads of factor analysis, multitraitlmultimethod matrices, self-reports versus ratings by others, discriminant validity , divergent validity , halo
bias, social desirability response sets, and on and on . About the on ly reference to
psychological theory is, "An implicit assumption of most theorists is that selfconcept is multifacted" (p. 334). Further, it is said to be formed out of experience with the environment and interactions with "significant others." Clearly,
this is a picture of psychometrics running amuck! Big methodological guns
loaded with folk wisdom and truisms. This factor analytic mincing could go on
forever; we could , of course, equally well discover ' 'automobile self-concept,"
"favorite football team self-concept," or even "preferred Baskin-Robbins flavor self-concept. "
The problem with this empirical hustle and bustle is that it is thoroughly
innocent of any serious theory about the psychological sense of self: how it
develops, what it is, how it can become sick, how to make it well. How adequately do the Rogerian theory and the other commonsense accounts of "selfconcept" stand up to the " risky " tests of explanatory scope which alone will
separate idle psychologizing from respectable theory, such risky tests as accounting for the ephemeral sense of identity of a thoroughly decompensated schi zophrenic , the sense of gender identity so confused as to cause a man wilfully to
multilate hi s body surgically and chemically , the dangerous line between
positively cathected self-representations and neurotic narcissism , the sp lintered
selves of a multiple personality , or the more ordinary feelings of depression and
emptiness in a child whose every act prompts nothing but praise and reward from
the "significant others" of his environment? Unless our theories reach this far,
they are in jeopardy of being not so much false as uselessly redundant with
ordinary common sense.
It will surprise many to learn perhaps that one can scarcely find any reference
in all of Freud 's voluminous writings to a "self-concept," and that the term does
not even appear in the lex icographic bible of psychoanalysis , Laplanche and
Pontalis's The Language of Psychoanalysis (1973). Furthermore, in the writings
of the neo-Freudians , those things that William James once thought of and the
person-in-the-street now thinks of as the "self-concept" have been resolved into
an extremely complex braid of developmental strands (including , among other
things , identity formation a la Mahler) through stages of autism, merged self and
object representations , differentiated representations, "practicing" and rapprochement subphases to gender identify and separation-individuation; or (a fa
Kohut) the formation of the ego ideal from disillusionment with the grandiose

2.

TESTING OLD, TESTING NEW

21

self whose roots reach to the stage of infantile primary narc issism; or (a La S.
Freud , A. Freud , Mahler, Jacobson and nearly every neo-Freudian) the construction of personal identity through identification with the loved or hated object.
Neo-Freudian ego psychology has made exc iting advances in those areas referred
to colloquially as "self-concept" or "self-esteem"; the best didactic treatment
of the past forty years of this research is the impress ive two-volume work by
Gertrude and Rubin Blanck, Ego Psychology: Theory and Practice (1974) and
Ego Psychology II: PsychoanaLytic DeveLopmental PsychoLogy (1 979). This corpus of research can be commended to the attention of psychometricians; it has
been attended to by at least one such, but more abo ut that later.
In her summation on the state of self-concept measurement , Ruth Wi ley
( 196 1, pp. 3 17 ff.) criti cized much of the psychometric work she reviewed on
account of its theoretical naivete. She was more generous than I might have been
in the same situation (she being rather charitable toward some trivial conceptuali zations), and her own grasp of the role of "self" in psychodynamic theory
was weak. Nonetheless, she did identi fy the yawning gap between psychometric
practice and psychoanalytic theory: " ... certain psychologists have thought
that self-concept research yields weak or eq ui vocal results because the theory
does not systematically include the unconsc ious se lf concept, or other unconsc ious cogn itive and dynamic processes" (Wiley, 196 1, p. 3 19). Although she
thereafter goes on to place an unhealthy emphas is on the criterion of predictive
validity for deciding whether new and unusual constructs (like the Freudian
unconscious) should be allowed into the test battery, her sense of the seriousness
of the om iss ion of the unconscious from consideration of "self-concept" seems
completely justifi ed . Indeed, the situation is typical of academic psychology's
long relationship with Freudi an psychology. Everyw here theorists and practitioners wish to cook the Freudian omelet without breaking the Freudian eggs. It
cannot be done; the unconsc ious (whose ex istence is proved daily in our actions
and nightly in our dreams) is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis and it cannot be
locked in the closet like some shameful secret if psychology (and psychometrics)
are to form any meaningful connection with psychoanalysis.
Consider Jane Loev inger's (Loev inger & Wessler, 1970) work on the measurement of ego development. Loev inger, an earl y-day quantitative psychologist
and psychometrician, has spent the last three decades engaged in an amb itious
attempt to develop measures of some of those emotional-cogn itive processes
talked about by the neo-Freudians, and which she covers with the title "ego
development." Her efforts took off from a thorough understa nding of traditional
psychometric technique and its deficiencies for capturing what the ego psychol og ists were writing abo ut: (a) there ex ists no one-to-one correspondence between
a particular behavioral act and a level of ego development; (b) many strands of
ego development occur simultaneously and one bit of behavior may refl ect more
than one strand ; (c) no error-free way ex ists of distinguishing signs of developmental levels from signs of non-developmental corre lates; (d) each individual
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di spl ays behavior at more than o ne leve l of ego matu rity; (e) a behaviora l sign
may be di scriminating in onl y one direction; and so on . Ironi ca lly, the one
difficulty that Loevinger clearly identified and sought to overcome in her cho ice
of psychometric fo rmat (sentence completion) and the vo luminous and demanding scoring guides is prec isely the point on which her critics allege that she
departed from psychoanalytic theory . Loevinger wrote :
... no behavioral tas k can be guaranteed to displ ay just what one wants to know
about ego level. Neither a structured test nor an unstructured test carries a guar'antee. If the test is structured, the investi gator is projecting his own frame of reference
rather than tapping the frame of reference of hi s subjects, which is the very thing
that reveals their ego level. If the test is unstructured, one cannot control what the
subject will choose to reveal (p. 9).

Loevinger must have fe lt she was steering a sa fe middle course through this
dilemma by choos ing incomplete sentences to be completed by the examinee
(e .g., " When I get mad .. . ," " When they avoid me . . . ," " When they
talked about sex , I . . . " ) and by struggling heroically with the free- form productions that result ; but Gertrude Blanck ( 1976) , whose understanding of Fre ud
and the neo-Fre udians is widely ho nored , bli stered Loev inger for her mi sunderstanding o f theory and for her choice o f method: " The methodology . . . is
simplistic, not alone by comparison (with psychoanalytic observati onal studies) ,
but in its own right. Sentence completion as a research too l cannot be taken
seriously because it re lies on consc ious responses and overl ooks the ir unconsc ious determinants" (p . 803).
I can agree enthu siasticall y at a general leve l with what Mi sc hel ca lled for in
hi s 1977 paper , " On the Future o f Personality Measurement ," vi z . , a broader
assess ment of persons fun ctioning in their environment. I can e ndorse who leheartedl y and accept as my own hi s prediction th at,
In the future, measurement hopefull y will be directed increas ingly at the anal ys is of
naturally occurring behav iors observed in the interactions among people in real -li fe
settings . . . . The future of personality measurement will be brighter if we can
move beyond our favorite pencil-and-paper and laboratory measures to include
direct observation as well as unobtrusive nonreactive meas ures to stud y li ves where
they are reall y lived and not merely where the researcher finds it convenient to look
at them (p. 248).

Hear! Hear! And yet. . .. What kind o f peeping does Mi sche l have in mind ?
And does he realize that if the dignity of the indi v idu als invo lved is respected ,
they will ultimately be the source of information about their own lives and w hat it
is like to li ve them; the assess ment of personality might better resemble a psychiatric interview than a bugged roo m with one-way mirro rs . Although Mi schel
seems to recogni ze thi s so mewhat and says that personality measurement mu st
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rely increasingly on self-reports, he finally (and di sappointingly from my perspective) asserts his identity as an American academic psycholog ist and repudiates the unconsc ious, even suggesting ob liquely that a couple of experiments and
his own textbook have disproved its ex istence. Lord! Don ' t these psycholog ists
ever sleep? And if they do , do they never dream?

A "Reflection on Schoolboy Psychology"

It is with regard to the role of unconscious processes that the relationship between psychoanalysis and psychometrics will be determined. If psychometrics
continues to view the unconsc iou s with arm's length suspicion as something
unsavory or pathological or unscientific, then the opportunities for useful coll aboration will be few.
It is, I believe, through a largely unconsc ious process of identification that we
become truly educated . We grow to be like those we love . Our teachers g ive us
an identity- not facts, not even a significant amount of whatever go lden things
lie at the highest leve l of Bloom's taxonomy . We are, each of us, living out li ves
that we took from someone e lse, someone we have loved and whose image we
hold close by be ing what they were. Freud (1 9 14) said as much in his "Some
Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology."
... it is hard to decide whether what affected us more and was of g reater importance to us was o ur co ncern wit h the scie nccs that we we re tau ght or with the
personalities of our teachers.. . We courted them or turned our backs on them ,
we imag ined sy mpathi es and antipathies in them which probably had no ex istence,
we studi ed the ir charac ters and on the irs we formed or mi sformed o ur o wn . Thcy
ca lled up our fiercies t opposit io n and forced us to compl ete submi ss ion; we pee red
into thei r littlc weaknesses , and took pride in the ir excellences . .. we ca n now
understand o ur relation to o ur sc hoo lm as ters. Thcse men , not all of whom were in
fact fathers themselves , became o ur subs titute fat hers (p . 242).

There is in these instances of unconsc ious identification more about the true
course of education ,3 the way it shapes and molds and occas ionally transforms
us , than there is in all the behavioral objectives and mastery qui zzes and standardized tests that ever were written . C hildren take more from the adults of the ir
world than knowledge or training or even chromosomes. Through a process of
identifi cation , which springs large ly fro m unconsc ious motives, they take a way
of li ving that reaches to every corner o f the ir li ves. The dynamics of identification form some of the more interesting themes in that unstudied genre of liter'The true aims of ed ucati o n, as Michae l Oakeshott [1 972 , p . 40j charac teri zed them , are".
initi ati o n into the mysteries of a human conditio n; the g ift of se lf-k now ledge and of a sati sfy ing
inte llec tu al and mora l identity. "
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ature perhaps best ca lled " teacher fiction " (e. g ., the relationship of Godfrey St.
Peter and Tom Outland in Willa Cather's Th e Professor' s House, or the loathesome dynamics in Muriel Spark 's The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie). We must look
in such places as these (the unconsc ious origins of identi fication , for one) with
such peculiar instruments as interviews and free ly flowing association and , yes,
even dreams , if we wish to find the secrets of how children come to ass ume their
individual ad ult form s.
There are two sides to this matter of the enduring impress ions that education
sometimes leaves. I spoke of one side, that seen by the marble. Now let the
sculptor speak . Another man , Loren Eiseley , who after publishing The Immense
Journey was acclaimed sc ientist and poet by the likes of Auden, once described4
the view from the lectern:
Now , for many years an ed ucator, I often feel the need to seek out a quiet park
bench to survey mentally that vast and nameless river of st udents which has poured
under my hands . In pain I have meditated: "This man is dead - a sui cide . Was it I,
all unknowi ng ly, who directed , in some blac k hou r, his hand upon the gun ?"
"This man is a liar and a cheat. Where did my stroke go wrong?" Or there comes
to memory the man who , after long endeavors , returned happily to the farm from
which he had come. Did I serve him , if not in the world' s eye, we ll ? Or the richl y
endowed young poet whom I she ltered from hi s father's wrath - was I pa mpering
or defendin g- and at the ri ght or the wron g moment in hi s life? Contingency,
contingency, and eac h day by word or deed the chi sel fallin g tru e or blind upon the
future of so me boy or g irl.
Ours is an ill -paid profess ion and we have our share of foo ls . We, too , li ke the
generat ion befo re us, are the cracked, the battered , the malformed products of
remoter chi sels shap ing th e most obsti nate substance in the universe: the substance
of man . Someone has to do it , but perh aps it mi ght be done more kindly, more
prec isely , to the ex tent that we are conscious ly aware of what we do- even if that
thought sometimes congeals our hearts with terror. O r, if we were more co nsc ious
of our task , wo uld our hands shake or grow immobilized upon the chisel?
I do not know. I know only that in these late faint-hearted years I so metimes
pause with my hand upon the knob before I go forth into the classroom. I am
afflicted in thi s fashi on because I have co me to fo llow Dewey in hi s remarks th at
" nature is see n to be marked by hi stories." As an evolutionist I am fam iliar wi th
that vast sprawlin g emergent , th e uni verse, and its even more fant asti c shadow ,
life. Stranger still , however, is the record of the artis t who creates the sy mbols by
whi ch we li ve . As Dewey has aga in anti c ipated , " No mec hanically exact sc ience
of an individual is poss ible. An individual is a hi story unique in character. "
" But ," he re marks, " constituents of an individual are known when they are
regarded not as qu alitative, but as stati sti cal co nstants derived from a series of
operat ions" ( 1962 , p . 25).
41n a book ded icated to Le tt a May Clark , Eisc ley's Engli sh teacher at Un ivers it y of Nebraska
Hi gh School: Th e Mind As Nalilre. NO.5 in the John Dewey Society Lectureshi p, New York , Harper
& Row, 1962.
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Eiseley went on to examine creativity:
th at enigma to which the
modern student of educational psychology is devoting more and more attention "
(1962, p . 28). In 1962 when Eiseley wro te these words, educational psychologists did indeed as pire to measure and explore such "stati stical constants" as
creativity and motivation and trust and perseverance and "social competence ." I
am old enough to remember when psychometricians spoke unashamedly of their
aspirations to capture more of human experience th an the IQ. Now they seldo m
confess such ambitio ns, content instead , it seems, to refine endlessly the mathematical foundations of meas uring nothing in particul ar. And this concerns me
more than anything else about the present condition of tes ting and its futu re: that
its disciples no longer share any sense of wonder or fasc ination about the development of tho ught , the nurture of talent , the mysteries of human personality .
Without the as piration to understand human growth and behavior, testing will
drift further fro m those sc iences that keep such aspi rations ali ve.
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